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This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that
identical messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that
strategic agents frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, i.e. they
deliberately choose less precise messages than they have to among the ones available
to them in equilibrium. Having to communicate with a vague language can be welfare
enhancing because it mitigates conict. In equilibria that satisfy a dynamic stability
condition intentional vagueness increases with the degree of conict between sender
and receiver.
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We frequently are intentionally vague, i.e. we make statements that are open to interpretation
although more precise statements are available. A variety of possible explanations come to
mind: Social norms may prevent us from being too blunt, more precision may require more
eort, or vagueness may serve to control the ow of information. In this paper, we focus on
the strategic use of vague messages to manipulate information.
We take it as given that language is an imperfect technology that leaves messages subject
to interpretation. Language is vague in this sense because the receiver's interpretation of
a message, while generally close to the sender's intent, need not perfectly coincide with it.
A further source of vagueness, intentional vagueness, results when strategically-motivated
senders choose messages with less denite interpretations when they could be more precise;
specically, they opt not to send the message that, given the receiver's equilibrium response,
would maximize receiver utility.
We ask when exogenous vagueness is compounded by strategic concerns and when, in
contrast, it can help moderate strategic concerns and mitigate conict. Importantly, we
show that strategic players try to utilize exogenous vagueness rather than merely to mini-
mize its eects. In our framework, there is a natural coexistence of messages with dierent
endogenously generated degrees of vagueness. Privately informed speakers select from this
menu of dierentially vague messages and in many cases elect to be more vague rather than
less vague.
Some situations and institutions are notorious for vague communication. For instance, in
negotiating sexual relationships, interest is typically not expressed too overtly. Instead the
parties involved resort to irting and innuendo. Pinker [30] asserts that \It is in the arena
of sexual relationships, however, that the linguistic dance can be its most elaborate." He
continues by recounting an event from a Seinfeld episode: \George is asked by his date if he
would like to come up for coee. He declines, explaining that caeine keeps him up at night.
Later he slaps his forehead: `Coee doesn't mean coee! Coee means sex!'" Similarly,
legal statutes are widely perceived as subject to interpretation and there is an ongoing
debate about which interpretive stance is appropriate for the judiciary. This is emphasized
1by Rizzo and Arnold [34] who state that \In reality, however, there are numerous sources of
ambiguity and vagueness in any statute, ranging from disputes concerning the meaning of
simple statutory language to uncertainties about overall legislative intent." A third example
is that of central-bank announcements. According to Stein [41] (p. 32) \It is not that
the Fed never makes any policy statements. Rather, the common complaint is that these
statements are vague, or dicult to interpret." Alan Greenspan, who was famous for his
inscrutability, stated that \Since I've become a central banker, I've learned to mumble with
great incoherence. If I seem unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I said."
(quoted in Geraats [15]).
Common to each of these situations is interpretability of messages. A given message does
not produce a single predictable response. Instead, the examples appear to be better de-
scribed by messages that induce a distribution of interpretations, some close to the speaker's
intent, and some that qualify as misunderstandings. In section 3, we revisit these examples
against the background of our model.
We model interpretability as noise in the communication process, where interpretations
are centered at but generally deviate from the intended message. This noisy communication
technology is exogenous. We then investigate the strategic use of such interpretable messages.
Our central ndings are that (i) an important component of vagueness is endogenous, with
speakers frequently choosing less precise messages than are available and (ii) this intentional
vagueness increases with the conict between sender and receiver. In addition, we conrm
our nding from earlier work (Blume et al. [4]) that exogenous vagueness may be eciency
enhancing when there is sucient conict of interest between the parties.
The exogenous component of vagueness is represented by the noise in the language,
formally measured by the variance of the distribution of interpretations conditional on the
sent message. The endogenous component comes from the fact that similar messages are
more likely to induce similar interpretations, and one type of speaker may send a message
close to the preferred message of another type. This increases overlap in the distribution
of interpretations and therefore compromises the integrity of both messages. We show that
frequently speakers of some type will take advantage of this option and be intentionally
vague by sending a message close to, although not identical with, the preferred message
2of another type, while they could more reliably identify their own type by sending a more
distant message. A potential welfare benet from increasing the overlap of distributions and
thereby increasing vagueness is that it has a moderating eect on the listener's response to
the message and therefore diminishes the scope for strategic manipulation by the speaker.
We show that there are instances in which this eect enables communication that could not
be achieved with a precise language.
The term `vagueness' itself is subject to, sometimes contentious, interpretation. We
are not interested in being drawn into this debate, but we should dierentiate our usage
from some related work in the literature. Specically, there is a sense in which equilibrium
messages in the model of strategic information transmission studied by Crawford and Sobel
[6] (henceforth CS) are vague. In the CS model, whenever there is conict of interest between
the sender and receiver, equilibrium messages cannot be fully revealing but each has as its
referent a nontrivial subset of the type space: the set of types who pool on that message.1
Unlike in our model, however, there is no role for interpretation in the CS model. Regardless
of which message he sends, the sender knows exactly how the receiver will respond to that
message. Likewise the receiver, while he may be uncertain about which type sent a given
message, knows precisely which set of types the message refers to and which action he is
expected to take.
Interestingly, there is another feature of equilibrium behavior in the CS model that has
not received as much attention but comes to the fore in our model: Taking the receiver's
equilibrium strategy as xed, the receiver prefers for some subset of types that they deviate
from their equilibrium strategies.2 These types engage in deception in the sense that they
do not induce the action closest to their type.3 In the CS model this deceiver set is generally
1In fact, in a survey paper, Crawford [7] writes that \the Sender's messages reect a kind of intentional
vagueness". Note that we use the phrase \intentional vagueness" in a dierent sense. For us, intentional
vagueness neither implies nor is implied by pooling.
2In Appendix B we compute the ex ante utility loss for the receiver resulting from this behavior.
3Note that in a later paper, Crawford [8] declines to interpret this behavior as deception (\Crawford and
Sobel's equilibria have no active misrepresentation, only intentional vagueness"). This view is supported by
the fact that, in the CS model, the receiver is able precisely to identify each message with a given set of types.
He constructs an alternative, behavioral, model of deception, and credits Sobel [40] with the rst equilibrium
explanation of lying. Ettinger and Jehiel [12] also provide an analysis of deception within an equilibrium
framework. Finally, Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani [23] study strategic information transmission when
messages directly aect payos, either because the sender faces a cost of lying or receivers are credulous. In
their environment, an exogenous mapping from the state space to the message space endows each message
3a non-convex subset of the type space. In our model the deceiver set is convex and includes
all types that are not constrained by the message space. But in both models the sender is
intentionally vague for a subset of the type space that has positive probability. The sender
is less precise than she could be with the messages that are available to her in equilibrium,
where by \less precise" we mean that she does not send the message that, given the receiver's
equilibrium response, would maximize receiver utility.
The purpose of the present paper is to yield a deeper understanding of the phenomenon
of intentional vagueness. Specically, we show that it is not specic to concealment of infor-
mation through pooling of types that is characteristic of CS equilibria. In our environment
in equilibrium all types whose messages do not coincide with the boundaries of the message
space send distinct messages and at the same time are intentionally vague.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes our model for the case of
two sender types, which is our main focus. We provide necessary and sucient conditions
for the existence of a communicative equilibrium, and demonstrate that the low type of
the sender will frequently be intentionally vague in such an equilibrium. We then dene
excess demand for vagueness and show how it can be used to study the structure of the
equilibrium set. We also introduce a simple dynamic according to which the low-type sender
increases vagueness by raising his message whenever his excess demand for vagueness is
positive and vice versa. For equilibria that are hyperbolically stable under this dynamic,
we show that equilibrium vagueness increases with the degree of conict between sender
and receiver. We also demonstrate the existence of a stable equilibrium and show that
pooling is asymptotically stable if and only if the degree of conict is high relative to the
prior probability of a high type. In Section 3, we revist the examples discussed above in
the context of this model. Section 4 generalizes our model to an arbitrary nite number,
n, of types, extends the concept of intentional vagueness to the n-type case, demonstrates
that in any monotone equilibrium pooling can only occur at the top and the bottom of the
type space and that the remaining (interior) types will all be intentionally vague. Section 5
consider an extension of the model where the sender can choose between noisy or noiseless
with an intrinsic meaning, and, a fortiori, orders the message space. When the state space is unbounded,
they demonstrate that there are fully revealing equilibria where there is language ination in the sense that
senders systematically send messages corresponding to higher types than their own.




There are two players, a sender, S; and a receiver, R. At the beginning of the game the
sender observes a private signal, her type. The sender's type t takes one of two values, 0
with probability (1   ) or 1 with probability  2 (0;1).4 After observing t, the sender sends
a message m from the set M = [0;1]. If message m is sent, the receiver's interpretation
q 2 R is drawn from a normal distribution with mean m and variance 2. The receiver
observes q but not the sender's type or the message she actually sent, and takes an action,
a 2 A = R: Payos for the sender and receiver are given by US (a;t;b) =  (t + b   a)
2 and
UR (a;t) =  (t   a)
2 : So, messages have no direct eect on payos and b > 0 (the bias of
the sender) measures the degree to which the sender's and the receiver's preferences coincide.
The sender's strategy is a pair m = (m0;m1), where mt 2 M is the message she sends
when her type is t; we assume without loss of generality that m0  m1.5 The receiver's
strategy is an action function a : R ! R describing which action he chooses for each in-
terpretation he might receive. In a (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium, each player's strategy
is optimal given her opponent's strategy and her beliefs, and those beliefs are derived from
Bayes' rule whenever possible. For the sender, this means that her chosen message must
maximize her expected payo given her type. Since the normal distribution has full support,
the receiver's beliefs about t are uniquely determined by Bayes' rule from the sender's strat-
egy; and with quadratic preferences, his expected utility is maximized when he chooses an
action equal to his expectation of t, which is simply his belief that t = 1. To save notation,
4The two-type model suces to make our main point that strategic players add intentional vagueness to
a vague language. Furthermore, it allows us to provide a nearly complete characterization of the conditions
under which communicative equilibria exist for the entire range of prior type distributions. We will show
later how to extend our analysis to an arbitrary nite number of types.
5A simple symmetry argument shows that if there is an equilibrium in which the sender chooses messages
m0 and m1 with m0 > m1, then there is a corresponding equilibrium in which she chooses messages 1   m0
and 1   m1.
5we suppress the receiver's beliefs in our formal denition of equilibrium.
Denition 1 An equilibrium is a strategy prole (m;a) where
m
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(1   )  m
0;2 (q) +   m
1;2 (q)
, for all q 2 R, (2)
where m;2 (q) is the density of the normal distribution with mean m and variance 2.
Whatever the parameters of the model, for every m 2 [0;1], there is a (pooling) equi-
librium with m
0 = m
1 = m. In this case, the receiver's observed interpretation conveys no
information about the sender's type, so his expectation of t and hence his action are equal
to  (his prior expectation); this strategy does not depend on q, so whatever her type, the
sender can do nothing better (or worse) than send message m.
We are more interested in the possible existence of communicative equilibria, where
m
0 6= m
1. The next subsection investigates when a communicative equilibrium exists.
2.2 Existence of a communicative equilibrium
It is well known that in cheap talk models, communication is possible only if the interests
of the sender and the receiver are suciently closely aligned. In the present context, it is
easy to see that there cannot be a communicative equilibrium if b  1; on the other hand,
if b = 0, there is always a communicative equilibrium with maximal dierentiation, where
m0 = 0 and m1 = 1. Although it is not in general possible to provide an analytic solution
for communicative equilibria when b takes on an intermediate value, we are able to do so for
the special case where b = 1
2.
Proposition 1 Suppose the sender's bias b is equal to 1
2. Then
1. if   1
2, there is no communicative equilibrium;
62. if  > 1















The proof of this and all other results can be found in the appendix. First notice that,
when a communicative equilibrium exists, the type-1 sender always chooses m
1 = 1. This
is because she wants a higher action (1 + b) than the receiver, regardless of his beliefs, and
hence chooses the highest message available. This observation holds true in any commu-
nicative equilibrium, regardless of parameter values (see Lemma 3 below). It follows that a
communicative equilibrium can be completely characterized by the message m
0 chosen by
the type-0 sender. In the equilibrium described above, m
0 is a (weakly) decreasing function
of  and of . When  is close to 1
2, m
0 is strictly between 0 and 1: the type-0 sender sends
a dierent message from her type-1 counterpart, but does not identify herself as precisely as
she could: she is intentionally vague. Recall from the introduction that we characterized the
precision of a message by comparing it to the message that, given his equilibrium response,
the receiver would have wanted the sender to send. In any communicative equilibrium, the
receiver's utility is maximized when the type-0 sender chooses m0 = 0, so we have inten-
tional vagueness whenever m
0 > 0, and furthermore the value of m
0 measures the degree
of intentional vagueness, on a 0 to 1 scale.6 For higher values of , the equilibrium exhibits
maximal dierentiation, with m
0 = 0 and m
1 = 1. Figure 1 below plots m
0 as a function of
 when  = 1
2.
To understand better what happens in a communicative equilibrium, consider the case
where  = 3
4 (again, with  = 1
2). Figure 2 below plots the best-response action functions of
the receiver when the type-1 sender chooses:
(i) m0
0 = 0 (dotted red curve);
(ii) m
0 = 0:26 (solid black curve); and
6When b is low enough (less than 1
2) intentional vagueness can arise even in the benchmark model with
no noise ( = 0), in an equilibrium where the type-0 sender mixes between identifying herself and pooling
with the type-1 sender. Note that in such an equilibrium, unlike in the case with noise described above, the
type-0 sender suers no loss from full identication. Further, this equilibrium is always Pareto dominated
by another equilibrium.









Figure 1: Equilibrium values of m0 when b = 1
2 and  = 1
2.
(iii) m00
0 = 0:52 (dotted blue curve).
In the diagram we consider three dierent messages the type-0 sender could send in a
candidate equilibrium. In each case, the optimal message for her to actually send is where
the resulting action function crosses a = 1
2. This follows from two facts, both proved in
the appendix: (i) the action function is rotationally symmetric about this point (Lemma 1);
and (ii) the type-0 sender's utility is strictly quasiconcave in m0 (Lemma 4). Since b = 1
2,
it follows from (i) that, for any given action function, the sender's utility has reectional
symmetry about the interpretation where a = 1
2; given (ii), this must correspond with the
optimal message for the sender to choose. At m0
0 = 0, then, the sender wants to send a higher
message than she currently is (indicated by the vertical red line), while at m00
0, the sender
wants to send a lower message (given by the vertical blue line). When m
0, the message the
sender wants to send and the message she is sending coincide and we have an equilibrium.
Our next two results show, if we x  and , the degree of vagueness chosen by the type-0
sender in equilibrium depends on her bias. Proposition 2 states that, if b is low enough, the
unique communicative equilibrium exhibits maximal dierentiation, i.e. m
0 = 0. This result
is reminiscent of CS's nding that more communication is possible when the sender's and
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Figure 2: Communicative equilibrium, b = 1
2,  = 3
4, and  = 1
2.
9Proposition 2 There exists b 2 (0;1) such that for all b 2 [0;b] there is a unique commu-
nicative equilibrium, in which m
0 = 0.
If the bias is higher than this value, on the other hand, the type-0 sender may choose to
be vague. It might be tempting to conclude that the equilibrium degree of vagueness is a
(weakly) increasing function of the sender's bias b. Under an additional stability condition,
this turns out to be true, though we can nd counterexamples when this condition does
not hold. We explain why, and explore the comparative statics of the model in more detail
in section 2.4. Here we present a weaker result, Proposition 3, which states that, for any
message m 2 (0;1), we can nd a b such that there is a communicative equilibrium with
m
0 = m.
Proposition 3 For any message m 2 [0;1), there exists a bias b 2 (0;1) for which m
0 = m
in a communicative equilibrium.
We now address the issue of when a communicative equilibrium exists. Our next result
establishes a sucient condition for existence.
Proposition 4 The condition b <  is sucient for the existence of a communicative equi-
librium.
To understand why the value of , the prior probability that the sender's type is 1, is
important for the possibility of communication, observe that  is also equal to the receiver's
expectation of t in a pooling equilibrium. Hence whenever b < , the type-0 sender has
some incentive to separate herself from the higher type. In the absence of noise, separation
is \all-or-nothing", and hence can be achieved in equilibrium only when b  1
2; when the
bias is larger than this, the type-0 sender would prefer the action (a = 1) induced by the
other type to the action (a = 0) she induces herself. In the present setting, however, noise
prevents complete separation and by choosing a message arbitrarily close to m1 = 1, the
type-0 sender can obtain (in equilibrium) an expected action that is arbitrarily close to .
As long as b < , then, we can always nd a message m0 < m1 which generates an equilibrium
with some degree of separation, and therefore some communication.
10When  is larger than 1
2, the condition b <  is also necessary for the existence of an
informative equilibrium.
Proposition 5 If   1
2, the condition b <  is necessary for the existence of a communica-
tive equilibrium.
When  is less than 1
2, however, communication may be possible even if b > . For
example, if  = 0:1, b = 0:13 and  = 1, there are in fact two communicative equilibria, with
m
0 = 0 and with m
0 = 0:27 (we explain how to nd such equilibria in the next section);
with  = 0:1, b = 0:3 and  = 1, however, no communicative equilibrium exists. Although
we do not in general know how large b has to be before communication breaks down, the
next results states that b  1
2 is too large.
Proposition 6 If  < 1
2, the condition b < 1
2 is necessary for the existence of a communica-
tive equilibrium.
Figure 3 below summarizes Propositions 4 { 6, and shows when communication is possible
with and without noise.
1. b > 1
2, b > : communication is not possible with or without noise;
2. b > 1
2, b < : communication is possible only with noise;
3. b < 1
2, b > : communication is possible without noise, and may be possible with noise;
4. b < 1
2, b < : communication is possible with and without noise.
Note that in region 2 noise generates a potential Pareto improvement: without it, no mean-
ingful communication would be possible. This conrms our observation in earlier work [4]
that noise can be eciency enhancing.
2.3 Finding communicative equilibria and the excess demand for
vagueness
As mentioned in the previous section, we are unable to nd communicative equilibria for










Figure 3: Existence of communicative equilibria with and without noise.
characterized by a single rst-order condition, however, we can compute equilibria numer-
ically. First recall that, in equilibrium, the receiver chooses an action that is equal to his
expectation of the sender's type, given his interpretation q. Let  denote this expectation
as a function of the messages m0 and m1 that the receiver expects the sender to use, i.e.
(q;m0;m1;;) 
  m1;2 (q)
(1   )  m0;2 (q) +   m1;2 (q)
.










22  m0;2 (q)dq.
So V gives us the expected payo of the type-0 sender from sending message m0 when
the receiver expects her to use message m0 (assuming, as in the previous section, that the
type-1 sender sends message m1 = 1). We show in the appendix (Lemma 4) that the rst-
order condition V3 (b;m0;m0) = 0 is sucient for m0 to be the unique global maximizer of
12V (b;m0;). If m0 coincides with m0 6= 1, we have a communicative equilibrium. By plotting
V3 (b;m;m) between m = 0 and m = 1, then, we can nd all such equilibria. Given the
non-negativity constraint, two kinds of solution are possible:
1. m
0 = 0: communicative equilibrium with maximal dierentiation (V3 (b;0;0)  0);
2. m




We nd it useful to think of z (b;m)  V3 (b;m;m) as measuring the excess demand for
vagueness: this function tells us how much the sender of type 0 would benet from sending
a slightly higher, and hence more vague, message than the receiver is expecting.
Figure 4 shows the excess demand for vagueness for various parameter values.
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Figure 4: Excess demand for vagueness for dierent parameter values ( = 1)
13Notice that the excess demand function is always zero at m = 1: in this case the expectation
function  is at, so the sender obtains no benet (or loss) from changing her message.
When b < , the function is positively sloped at m = 1; this explains Proposition 4: the
function must either still be negative when m = 0, in which case we have a communicative
equilibrium with maximal dierentiation (case (ii)) or it must be positive. If the latter, it
follows from continuity and the Intermediate Value Theorem that we have a communicative
equilibrium with intentional vagueness (case (iv)). When b > , the function is negatively
sloped at m0 = 1, and there is no guarantee of a communicative equilibrium. Indeed, if   1
2
or b  1
2, Propositions 5 and 6 tell us that there is no communicative equilibrium (case (iii)).
If  < 1
2 and b < 1
2, on the other hand, one or more communicative equilibria may exist (case
(i)).
Note that the lowest equilibrium (measured in terms of the message sent by the type-0
sender) ex ante Pareto dominates any others.
2.4 Equilibrium Selection and Comparative statics in b: An Ap-
plication of the Correspondence Principle
In this section we introduce a dynamic on the space of sender strategies that have the form
(m;1), where the type-0 sender sends message m and the type-1 sender sends message 1.
Doing so serves the dual purposes of helping us obtain sharp comparative statics predictions
for variations in the sender's bias and selecting equilibria in this class of strategies.
Recall the excess demand for vagueness function z (b;m)  V3 (b;m;m) introduced in
the previous section. Analogous with the excess demand function in Walrasian general
equilibrium theory, this function measures the degree to which the sender wishes to increase
vagueness above the current level. Assume for simplicity that the receiver always best
responds to the sender's strategy and that the type-0 sender adjusts her message m in the
direction of her excess demand for vagueness. In continuous time, this suggests a dynamic
of the form
_ m = z (b;m),
14that is the time derivative of m is equal to the excess demand for vagueness.7 Call this the
vagueness dynamic. A type-0 message m 2 (0;1) is a stationary point of the vagueness
dynamic if z (b;m) = 0. If we call equilibria with m 2 (0;1) interior equilibria, then
for messages in the range m 2 (0;1) there is a one-to-one correspondence between interior
equilibria of the communication game and stationary points of the vagueness dynamic.
Of particular interest are stationary points m with the property
@z(b;m)
@m < 0. Such
stationary points are called hyperbolically stable (Hirsch and Smale [18], p. 187). Hyperbolic
stability implies asymptotic stability (i.e. after any suciently small displacement the dy-
namic will take us back to m), local uniqueness, and structural stability (Hirsch and Smale
[18], p. 305) (i.e. for suciently small perturbations of the function z (b;) the resulting dy-
namical system retains a unique hyperbolic equilibrium in a neighborhood of the original
equilibrium). Our principal reason for being interested in hyperbolic stability is that it has
strong implications for comparative statics in our model. This is a manifestation of the
correspondence principle that was formulated by Samuelson [35] and [36].8
Consider the comparative statics in b. Let m be an interior hyperbolically stable equi-
librium. Then, given that z is continuously dierentiable at (b;m), the Implicit Function
Theorem tells us that there exists an open interval I that contains b and a local solution
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The denominator of the expression on the right{hand side is negative because m is hyper-
bolically stable; we show in appendix (Lemma 5) that
@z(b;m)
@b > 0.
To summarize, call any equilibrium in which the sender uses the strategy (m;1) where
m is a hyperbolically stable stationary point of the vagueness dynamic a hyperbolically stable
7Our results would remain unchanged if we considered dynamics in the more general class _ m =  (z (b;m)),
where  : R ! R is any continuously dierentiable function with 0 (z) > 0 for all z 2 R and  (0) = 0.
8For a concise discussion of the correspondence principle, its history and related literature, see Echenique
[11].
15equilibrium with low message m. Then we have the following important comparative statics
result:
Proposition 7 Near any hyperbolically stable equilibrium with low message m; the low




This result has a natural interpretation. At any equilibrium that is dynamically stable
increasing the sender's bias results in increased intentional vagueness: More bias implies
more obfuscation.
A second reason for introducing the vagueness dynamic is that is suggests a way to select
among equilibria on the basis of their stability properties. The following result establishes
that Lyapunov stable equilibria always exist and shows that the vagueness dynamic rejects
pooling if the bias is small relative to .
Proposition 8 There exists at least one Lyapunov stable equilibrium. Pooling at m = 1 is
asymptotically stable if b >  but not even Lyapunov stable if b < :
At the end of the section 2.3, we note that the lowest equilibrium (measured in terms of
the message sent by the type-0 sender) ex ante Pareto dominates any others. Given Lemma
5, generically this equilibrium is asymptotically stable.
3 Interpretation
The two key elements that dierentiate our setup from the standard communication model
of CS are an ordering of the message space and noise that is related to this order. These
elements imply that the receiver's ability to infer which of two messages gave rise to his
interpretation increases with the distance between them. As a result mimicry becomes a
matter of degree: If the receiver expects sender type t to use message mt, a type t0 6= t can
decide how much he wants to appear like type t: In this manner the sender controls vagueness
by varying the distance between messages. A natural consequence of adopting this approach
16is that, unlike in the standard model, we can ask comparative statics questions about message
use: How does the distance between messages vary with the degree of conict between sender
and receiver? How does intentional vagueness vary with the degree of conict?
This departure from the standard model allows us to capture three important charac-
teristics of the strategic use of natural language. First, a given natural language imposes
some structure on words and sentences. For instance, we can put color words in the order
of the spectrum, rank statements by their strengths (e.g. the sincerity of an invitation or
the strength of expression of beliefs and feelings), or look for similarities in texts (topic,
terminology, mood, etc.). Similarly, in our model, an exogenous ordering is imposed on the
message space.
Second, there is frequently a gap between the meaning that the speaker attaches to
words and sentences in a natural language and the corresponding listener's meaning. One
individual's prototype for the color orange may be closer to the red side of the spectrum
than another's. From the speaker's perspective, therefore, when using the word \orange"
the perception induced in the listener's mind is a random variable. The speaker can aect
the distribution of this random variable by modifying his message, e.g. by using \vermilion"
to shift the receiver's perception to the red side of the spectrum or \ochre" to shift it to the
yellow side of the spectrum. In our model, the distinction between speaker's meaning and
listener's meaning is picked up by the dierence between m and q, the later being a random
variable whose distribution is determined by the former.9
Third, natural language use respects incentives. For example, a biased speaker may want
to exaggerate the redness of an object, and thus use \vermilion" even when in terms of the
receiver's likely interpretation \ochre" would be a more apt description of the color of the
object. As a result the listener's inference about the color of the object on average will
become less precise than the already imprecise inference that would result if the speaker
9Weaver [42] sketches a similar framework, where the speaker observes the state of the world, t, chooses
her intended meaning, m, but says p. There is randomness in the encoding of m into p; referred to by Weaver
as \semantic noise" (Weaver [42], p. 16). The sender may, for example, want to express vermilion, but says
\red orange" instead, as could be the case if the word \vermilion" momentarily escapes her or she is part
of a heterogeneous population of speakers in which there is variation in the use of color words. The listener
observes p, i.e. \red orange" and forms an interpretation q. There is additional randomness in the decoding
of p into q because the boundaries of \red orange" are uncertain, there is heterogeneity in the population of
listeners and the listeners' memory of p may be imperfect by the time they act.
17tried to communicate as eectively as possible. Solving for perfect Bayesian equilibria of our
model guarantees that actions are incentive compatible.
The listener's interpretation in our model is a non-degenerate random variable whose
distribution is determined by the speaker's intended meaning. It is natural to consider
distributions of interpretations that assign higher probability to interpretations near the
speaker's intended meaning than to more distant interpretations and that have full support.
Then, even if dierent types of speakers choose dierent intended meanings, for any two such
meanings there will be a boundary region of interpretations that are nearly as indicative of
one intended meaning as of the other. This resembles the fuzziness at the boundary that is
commonly taken to be the dening characteristic of vagueness in language.
In light of this interpretation of our model, we can now revisit our introductory examples.
In the Seinfeld example, the speaker is George's date and George is the listener. The type
space consists of the date's true intentions, e.g. fcasual friendship, sexg, and George's action
space consists of dierent degrees of involvement, with each degree implying how long he
will try to continue the conversation, whether to call in case he decides to go home, etc.
The elements of the message space are sentences in natural language that George's date
can use to express her intentions in varying degrees. They could range from a simple \Good
night" through \Would you like to come in for a coee?" to \I would like you to stay with me
tonight." There is noise in the production of these sentences, when George's date fails to nd
the right words to express her intentions or has a dierent perception from George about the
conventional meanings of these sentences. There is also noise in George's processing of these
sentences, again because of possibly dierent perceptions of their conventional meaning, but
also because by the time he responds he may not remember the exact wording, his date's
body posture or the inection in her voice. Even if George's date wanted to be perfectly
clear, her attempts might be frustrated if George cannot believe that his date really is so
blunt and therefore takes her statement to be ironic. George and his date are likely to have
dierent ideal points for their degree of involvement conditional on the date's type. Suppose
that George's date is interested in sex but biased in the direction of casual friendship. If
the date's bias is strong but not overwhelmingly so, in our model she can make a statement
that with high probability is interpreted as openness to some limited amount of intimacy.
18The noise smoothes out George's beliefs and as a result permits some ne tuning in the
date's manipulation of these beliefs and consequently of George's actions. For the audience,
the humor comes when George updates his interpretation, perhaps because he suddenly
remembers a cue that claries the likely meaning of the invitation for coee.
The belief-smoothing role of communication noise may also help us understand the vague-
ness of Alan Greenspan, and the mystique of central bank communication more generally.
Consistent with the exogenous noise in our model Geraats [15] notes that Greenspan's state-
ments were open to multiple interpretations and cites evidence in support of that claim.10
She further points out that a potential benet of such vagueness is that it helps avoid exces-
sively strong market reactions. Thus, as in the Seinfeld example, noise enables the speaker
to ne tune the listener's response. The fact that Greenspan had a reputation for opacity
suggests that dierent degrees of vagueness in speech are recognizable by the listener. This
could be captured by a variant of our model where we allow the speaker to choose not only the
mean but also the variance of the interpreation, and the variance is observable. We consider
such an extension in section 5. In that model there are equilibria in which the speaker uses
only messages with a xed variance, while other variances are o the equilibrium path and
induce an unfavorable receiver response. One might think then of Greenspan's comments on
his own inscrutability as an eort in equilibrium selection, i.e. to x the equilibrium variance
that will be used in subsequent communication.
Regarding statutory interpretation, our model is consistent with Posner's conception of
\legislation as communication" (Posner [32], p. 189) from legislatures to judges. Importantly,
he posits that the problem of interpretation arises because this communication is frequently
unclear. Following this line of reasoning, we can identify the receiver in our model with a
judge, the sender with a legislature, and the sender's private information with the legislature's
10Geraats uses the case of a speech that Alan Greenspan gave at the Economic Club of New on June
20, 1995. The following day the New York Times had the headline \Doubts voiced by Greenspan on
a rate cut," whereas the Washington Post's headline was \Greenspan hints Fed may cut interest rates."
Heterogeneity in the interpretation of central bank announcements is also noted by Alan Blinder: \Central
bank communication ...must have both a transmitter and a receiver, and either could be the source of
uncertainty or confusion. Moreover, on the receiving end, the same message might be interpreted dierently
by dierent listeners who may have dierent expectations or believe in dierent models." (Binder [3], p.
934)
19intent.11 There is a possible conict of interest between the judge and the legislature if
the judge's objective, within the constraints of the law, is to act on behalf of the public
interest, and the legislature is inuenced by interest groups, some of whom are more eective
than others.12 The noise in our model then captures Posner's idea that there is a need for
interpretation because of \unclear messages" (Posner [32], p. 188). He continues: \In our
system of government the framers of statutes and constitutions are the superiors of the
judges. The framers communicate orders to the judges through legislative texts (including,
of course, the Constitution). If the orders are clear, the judges must obey them. Often,
however, because of passage of time and change of circumstance the orders are unclear and
normally the judges cannot query the framers to nd out what the order means" (Posner
[32], p. 189). Besides the passage of time and change of circumstances, Posner cites the
political, social and cultural diversity of the legal community, context, and simple (but
apparently frequent) drafting errors as reasons for why messages may be unclear. The
view of noise in our model as an expression of such unclear communication is supported by
Farber and Frickey's [13] sketch of a stochastic model of interpretation of statutes, where
utility maximizing judges when deciding which of several interpretations to adopt, trade o
the likelihood of an interpretation being correct against the utility consequences of adoption
that interpretation. Also, our view of noise as reecting Weaver's \semantic problems" is
echoed by Boudreau et al's [5] emphasis on matching the process by which the \legislature's
intended meaning" (Boudreau et al [5], p. 8) is compressed in the legislative process with
the process by which it is expanded by the judge.
Interestingly, Posner suggests that we think of the consultation of legislative history in the
process of discerning statutory meaning as a repetition of unclear messages. Such repetitions
can easily be operationalized in a model like ours in the form of repeated costly draws from
the distribution of interpretations that is induced by the sender's (here, the legislature's)
message, whereas such repeated draws are irrelevant in communication models that are not
11Note that it is not without problems to attribute an intent to a legislative body.
12(Posner [32],p. 193) mentions explicitly that interest groups may cause \serious departures from opti-
mality" in legislatures. One of the key policy issues in the debate on judicial interpretation concerns the
legitimacy of the use of legislative history in the eort to determine the meaning of statutes. Farber and
Frickey [13] (p. 448) recognize the possibility that such evidence may be compromised by bias, but argue
that \...even if legislative history were systemically biased, that would not justify ignoring it, because a
decision maker can always compensate for known bias in assessing evidence."
20explicitly stochastic.
As with private communication (Seinfeld) or central-bank announcements (Greenspan),
there may be a role for imprecision as a moderator of conict between legislatures and judges,
when judges are guided by the public's interests and some interest groups are stronger than
others in legislatures. In that case, we can imagine legislatures adopting language that is
more vague than would be dictated by the diculty of proper encoding of legislative intent.
This moderating inuence of vagueness may also play a role when there is ideological conict
between legislature and judges. Commenting on tension between the U.S. Supreme Court and
Congress in the early 90s, Linda Greenhouse [16] wrote in the New York Times on November
3, 1991: \From the Court's institutional point of view, Congress makes unwelcome work for
judges, generating a ceaseless ow of poorly drafted, internally contradictory, deliberately
vague laws that the courts must somehow rationalize and interpret."
4 Monotone equilibria with an arbitrary nite number
of types
In this section we generalize our model to any nite number of types and characterize the set
of monotone equilibria. Our reason for being interested in monotone equilibria is that they
have an attractive stability property: If there is a communicative monotone equilibrium it
forms a singleton (and therefore minimal) curb set (Basu and Weibull [2]) whereas no pooling
equilibrium can be a member of a minimal curb set. We characterize monotone equilibria
by showing that pooling can only occur at the top or the bottom of of the type space. The
remaining interior types all send distinct messages. Our main result of this section is that
all interior types are intentionally vague in the sense that they distort their message relative
to the receiver's preferred message given the receiver's equilibrium strategy. Finally, using
the characterization of monotone equilibria, we calculate equilibria for a few special cases
in order to make some additional observations: (1) monotonicity can be infectious in that
ordering the messages of some types may restrict the order of messages used by the remaining
types, (2) dynamic stability retains some selective power, (3) noise can enable full separation
21with large biases, and (4) (in contrast to (3)) noise can prevent full separation even when
sender and receiver have common interests.
We consider the same model as in the previous section, except that the type space is an
arbitrary nite set T  [0;1]. There is a common prior distribution  on T so that for any
set   T; () denotes the probability that the sender's type belongs to the set : With
n types, a pure strategy for the sender is a vector m = (m1;m2;:::;mn), where mt denotes
the message sent by type t: Say that the strategy m is monotone if t > s ) mt  ms; it is
communicative if there exists a pair of types t0 and t00 with mt0 6= mt00.
Before characterizing monotone communicative equilibria, it is worth noting that when
such an equilibrium exists we have a simple renement argument that rules out pooling.
We show in the appendix (Lemma 5) that in a monotone communicative equilibrium the
receiver's action rule is strictly increasing. Therefore by Lemma 4 (appendix) the sender has
a unique best reply, and consequently any monotone communicative equilibrium is strict. A
strict equilibrium trivially satises the property that it is minimal among sets of strategies
that include all their best replies; i.e. it is a minimal curb set as dened by Basu and
Weibull [2]. Interestingly, whenever a monotone communicative equilibrium ec exists, no
pooling equilibrium, where the receiver's action is invariant to the interpretation, belongs to
a minimal curb set. This can be seen by way of contradiction: If a pooling equilibrium ep
did belong to an minimal curb set C, then C would have to include every sender strategy
and corresponding best reply of the receiver. Hence C would have to include ec, which is a
curb set in its own right. Therefore C could not be minimal. Our next result characterizes
the monotone communicative equilibria of our model.
Proposition 9 In a monotone communicative pure{strategy equilibrium, if distinct types s
and t send a common message m, then either m = 0 or m = 1:
In the case with two types we identied intentional vagueness with the low type sending
a message that is less precise than he could be given the receiver's equilibrium action rule.
With more than two types a natural generalization of this idea is to ask how close the sender's
chosen message is to the one the receiver would want him to choose taking the receiver's
equilibrium action rule as xed. Thus, an appropriate measure of the intentional vagueness
22of a sender's strategy m is
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and a(q;m) is the receiver's best reply to interpretation q.
In equilibrium, the following proposition shows that types who use interior messages
contribute positively to intentional vagueness.
Proposition 10 Fix a monotone communicative equilibrium with sender's strategy m. If
for some type t, we have mt 2 (0;1), then mt > m
t(m).
With more than two types we cannot expect the same strong comparative statics result
to hold that relates the degree of intentional vagueness to the level of conict in the two-
type case, where we have at a maximum one interior type. With multiple interior types,
the equilibrium response of one of these types to an increase in b indirectly aects the
incentives that govern another interior type's equilibrium response to the same change. A
given interior type's incentive to raise his message in response to an increase in b for a xed
action function of the receiver may be reversed under the inuence of changes in the receiver's
action function that result from the adjustments of other types. In addition, the message
that the receiver would like a given type to send varies with the equilibrium messages of
other types. Therefore, even if all interior types were to raise their equilibrium messages
in response to an increase in b, it need not be the case that they are all becoming more
intentionally vague according to our denition.
The forces that gave us the comparative statics result with two types, however, are still at
work. In the n-type case recall that a(q;m) denotes the receiver's best reply to interpretation
q when he expects the sender to use the strategy m: Then we can dene the payo of type
t from sending message m0









23and adapt our denition of the excess demand for vagueness for type t as follows
z(b;m;t)  V3(b;m;mt;t):
Then a straightforward generalization of Lemma 5 in the appendix (using Lemma 6) estab-
lishes
Proposition 11 For any monotone communicative sender strategy m and type t,
z1(b;m;t) > 0;
i.e., xing the receiver's best reply to a monotone communicative sender strategy each sender
type's excess demand for vagueness increases with the level of conict.
Using our result that pooling can only occur at the top or the bottom of T, one can
calculate equilibria with more than two types from the sender's rst-order conditions. For
example, with nine equally spaced types (type 0,..., type 8), a moderate variance ( = :3)
a small bias (b = :03) and a uniform prior there exists an equilibrium in which the three
lowest types send a common message, 0, the four highest types send a common message, 1,
and the two interior types 3 and 4 send distinct messages. Conditional, on the non-interior
types behaving as specied, the rst panel in the following gure plots the excess demand
for vagueness of the two interior types as functions of their messages (m3 for type 3 and m4
for type 4), in red for type 3, and in green for type 4; for comparison purposes we also plot,
in blue, the horizontal surface that corresponds to an excess demand for vagueness of zero.
The second panel plots the excess demand for vagueness of type 2, the highest of the three
low types who are meant to pool on message 0. The third panel plots the excess demand for
vagueness of type 5, the lowest of the four high types who are meant to pool on message 1.
We have an equilibrium with types 3 and 4 sending messages m
3 and m
4 provided (1) the
two excess demands in the rst panel simultaneously equal zero at (m3;m4) = (m
3;m
4) (i.e.
they intersect the blue surface at that point), (2) the excess demand for vagueness of type
2 is non-positive at (m3;m4) = (m
3;m
4) (i.e. it is underneath the blue surface), and (3)
the excess demand for vagueness of type 5 is non-negative at (m3;m4) = (m
3;m
4) (i.e. it is
24Figure 5: Equilibria with nine types and positive bias
25above the blue surface). This uses the fact that with a monotone action rule for the receiver
MLRP and single crossing imply that types 0 and 1 prefer to send a message that is no
higher than type 2's message and types 6, 7 and 8 prefer to send a message that is no lower
than the message sent by type 5.
It is noteworthy that conditional on the extreme types behaving as specied, the equilib-
rium with (m
3;m
4) is unique; for example, there is no equilibrium in which we can simply
switch the ordering of messages of the two interior types, or an equilibrium in which these
types pool with each other or with any of the remaining types. In this sense monotonicity
for the types 0, 1, 2 and 5, 6, 7, and 8 is infectious for types 3 and 4. Note also that the
equilibrium we have identied is asymptotically stable under a dynamic that generalizes the
one discussed in the last section: Types 0, 1 and 2 have strictly negative excess demands for
vagueness in a neighborhood of the equilibrium and therefore their messages would converge
to the boundary where m
0 = m
1 = m
2 = 0; types 5, 6, 7 and 8 have strictly positive excess
demands for vagueness in a neighborhood of the equilibrium and therefore their messages




8 = 1; the graphs of the excess
demands for vagueness functions of types 3 and 4 intersect the zero surface and each other




The eect of noise on sender separation is ambiguous and depends on the prior distribu-
tion, which we will demonstrate with two examples. In the rst example, with four equally
spaced types (type 0, ..., type 3 at 0, 1
3, 2
3 and 1), if there is no noise, then a bias of :2 is
not consistent with full separation (e.g. conditional on full separation, type 0 would want
to mimic type 1), regardless of the prior distribution of types. If we introduce a moderate
level of noise ( = :2 ), then for a type distribution where type i+1 is ten times as likely as
type i, there exists a separating equilibrium in which type 0 sends message 0, type 3 sends
message 1 and the messages sent by the remaining two types are given by the simultaneous
intersection of the graphs of the excess demand functions for vagueness of type 1 (red) and
type 2 (green) with the zero surface (blue) in Figure 6.
In our second example, with four types, 0, 1, 2 and 3, the eect of noise on separation is
reversed. Suppose that sender and receiver have common interests, i.e. b = 0: Without noise
26Figure 6: Noise makes separation possible
there is a large number of separating equilibria, in which it does not matter which type sends
which message as long as these messages are distinct. As the variance 2 increases, however,
it becomes impossible to support full separation in a monotone equilibrium, as shown in
Figure 7.
In both panels of the gure we plot the excess demand for vagueness of the types 1 and
2 as functions of their messages (given that type 0 sends 0 and type 3 sends 1). In the left
panel of the gure the variance is low,  = :1, and there are three candidate13 separating
equilibria, one of which is unstable under a natural generalization of our vagueness dynamic.
In the right panel, with  = 1, type 2's excess demand is everywhere positive and type 1's is
everywhere negative; i.e. type 1 will want to pool with type 0 and type 2 will want to pool
with type 3.
This is reminiscent of an observation made by Nowak, Krakauer and Dress [27]. They
allow for \the possibility of misunderstanding signals" and model a noise process in which the
probability that one signal is understood as another depends on their similarity, modelled
as distance in some metric space. They nd that at the \evolutionary optimum" only a
small number of signals is used to communicate a few valuable concepts. J ager [21] reports
on simulations that use a similar model in which normal noise is added to messages in a
two{dimensional space in an exploratory study of the evolution of vowel systems. The vowel
13The monotonicity condition m1 < m2 is satised in only one of these, so we do not know if global
incentive compatibility is satised in the other two.
27Figure 7: Equilibria with four types and common interests
systems that result from simulating this model closely resemble those reported in a survey
of vowel systems for natural languages by Schwartz, Boe, Vall e, and Abry [37]. In our
model, the restricted number of signals that are in use and their conguration are a direct
consequence of focussing on monotone communicative equilibria.
5 Choosing variance
The principal focus in this paper is on an environment in which the sender controls vagueness
through the distance between messages. This captures the intuition that similar messages
tend to induce similar inferences and that the sender can hedge by way of manipulating
the ne details of his message. In this section we briey explore the consequences of giving
the sender the additional choice between a noisy and a clear language. This permits us to
account for the fact that frequently it is obvious when someone is obfuscating, as in the case
of a mumbling Alan Greenspan.14
Formally, consider the same environment as before except that the sender now can choose
between communicating through a noisy channel, with  > 0, or a clear channel, where the
receiver's interpretation always coincides with the sender's message. The receiver observes
the choice of channel, i.e. whether or not the sender is obfuscating, in addition to his inter-
14Li [25] also considers a model where the sender has a choice of communication channels. Unlike in our
model, she assumes that there are reputational concerns for the sender, who can opt to communicate directly
with the receiver or indirectly through an intermediary.
28pretation.15 We call this the channel-choice game to dierentiate it from the noisy-channel
game that we have analyzed thus far.
The main question we are interested in is whether in this environment it remains the
case that vagueness can help mitigate conict. Intuitively, one might expect agents in the
channel-choice game to rely on the noisy channel, i.e. use a vague language, when there is
a high degree of conict and to use the clear channel, i.e. use a precise language, when the
bias is so small that noise is merely a nuisance. In this spirit, we will say that an equilibrium
of the noisy-channel game where the sender uses strategy m survives in the channel-choice
game if the channel choice game has an equilibrium in which the sender uses strategy m:
The following two results show that with a high bias monotone communicative equilibria in
the noisy-channel game survive in the channel-choice game, whereas they do not when there
is no bias.
Proposition 12 Regardless of the cardinality of the type set, if b > 1
2 and there exists
a monotone communicative equilibrium in the noisy-channel game, then this equilibrium
survives in the channel-choice game.
It is worth pointing out that essentially the same result continues to hold if we replace the
single clear channel by any number of channels ` = 1;:::;L and corresponding noise levels
`: In equilibrium the sender is expected to speak with an appropriate level of vagueness :
Any attempt to deviate from this level results in the receiver adopting the most pessimistic
beliefs and taking the lowest possible action.
In contrast, the following result shows that with common interests equilibrium vagueness
is vulnerable to the introduction of a clear channel. We will say that the sender exclusively
uses one channel if the set of types who use the other channel has probability zero.
15A number of papers in the industrial organization literature (e.g. [24], [22] and [20]) consider an envi-
ronment where a seller chooses the accuracy of information available to a buyer about the characteristics
of his product. Like our paper, these papers also make the assumption that the level of accuracy chosen
is publicly observable. In contrast to our paper, however, once he has chosen accuracy, the seller has no
further control over the signal observed by the buyers|the buyers' signals are hard information not cheap
talk; furthermore, in these models the buyers have private information about how they value certain product
characteristics.
29Proposition 13 With common interests and a continuum of types, the channel-choice game
does not have a communicative equilibrium where the sender exclusively uses the noisy chan-
nel.
Obviously, with common interests any equilibrium of the game where only the clear channel
is available (including full revelation) survives in the two-channel game.
With more than two types it is also possible to construct non-trivial equilibria in which
some types use the noisy channel and others the noiseless channel. For example, take a
communicative equilibrium of the two-type noisy-channel game with an extreme bias, b 2
(1
2;1); and a third type 0 that is suciently high that both of the original types prefer the
distributions of actions they induce in the original equilibrium to being mistaken for type
0. Then the three-type game has an equilibrium in which the original two types behave as
before, type 0 sends a clear message and after every clear message the receiver believes that
it was sent by type 0.
6 Related literature
In this section we review some closely related publications on vagueness and noisy commu-
nication.
A term is vague if it has borderline cases.16 In a borderline case it is not clear whether
the concept applies or not. The problems this causes are frequently illustrated by the sorites
paradox, or the paradox of the heap: It is clear that a single grain of sand is not a `heap',
that adding or removing a single grain of sand cannot make a dierence in whether a given
amount of sand constitutes a `heap,' and yet with enough sand we clearly have a heap. The
word heap has borderline case where we cannot decide whether a given amount of sand is
a heap or not. Therefore it is vague. Furthermore, there is higher-order vagueness: It is
not clear where we enter the region of borderline cases. The term `borderline cases' is itself
vague. `Vague' is vague.
The fact that there are cases where we appear to be unable to decide whether a given
statement, as `This is a heap', is true or false poses a challenge to conventional logic and
16For a concise summary of vagueness in philosophy see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vagueness/.
30may aect the ability and manner in which we communicate. In the philosophy literature
there are three principal approaches toward understanding and coping with vagueness, fuzzy
logic (Zadeh [44]), supervaluationism (Fine [14]) and the epistemic view (Williamson [43]).
Fuzzy logic replaces the two truth values `true' or `false' of standard logic by a continuum,
so that in a borderline case it may for example assign a truth value of :6. Supervaluationism
posits that in borderline cases vague predicates may be neither true nor false; there are
truth{value gaps. Finally, the epistemic view holds that in borderline there is a fact of the
matter, that is a vague predicate is either true or false, but we do not know which it is. To
appreciate why there is a debate, it may help to note that in fuzzy logic tautologies involving
vague predicates need not be true and that while supervaluationism rescues tautologies, at
the same time it invalidates some familiar inference rule, e.g. it is no longer the case that
showing that a statement is not true demonstrates its falsity.
While these three approaches are concerned with the use of language in individual rea-
soning, Rohit Parikh [29] addresses vagueness in communication and proposes what he calls
a utility{based approach. According to him vague predicates can be useful in communication
even if we cannot agree on their truth values in borderline cases: \There is no point in trying
to hide the dierences in meaning of words between dierent people. But as long as these
meanings are close enough, communication may be useful."
Rohit Parikh reports an experiment in which subjects were asked how many squares on a
partial Munsell color chart are red and how many are blue. Of thirteen participants no two
report the same numbers. In another similar experiment he shows that allowing for fuzzy
truth values does not improve agreement. He argues that nevertheless \...if two people
with slightly dierent extensions for the same words communicate, then this can be helpful
to them even though we cannot say exactly what was conveyed. This is why I can tell you
how to make tea, without telling you how to tell when the water is boiling, and also without
being sure that your notion of boiling water is the same as mine."
Reiter and Sripada [33] provide additional evidence and discuss the practical diculties
this gives rise to when designing systems for natural language generation, e.g. the translation
of meteorological data into weather forecasts, summaries of gas turbine sensors and sum-
maries of sensor readings in neonatal intensive care units. For example, experts diered in
31their use of the term \oscillation" when describing patterns in gas turbine sensor data and
in an informal experiment participants widely diered in their interpretation of the phrase
\knowing Java" from \cannot program in Java, but knows that Java is a popular program-
ming language" through \can use a tool such as JBuilder to write a very simple Java program
..." to \can create complex Java programs and classes ...."
Reiter and Sripada refer to the phenomenon that \people may not interpret words as
expected" as \a type of `semantic' noise." The phrase \semantic noise" is also employed
by Warren Weaver in his eort to extend the reach of Shannon's model of noisy commu-
nication to include not only noise at the engineering level but also \the perturbations or
distortions of meaning which are not intended by the source" (Shannon and Weaver [39],
p.26). Weaver goes on to suggest that the sender take the noise into account so that\the
sum of message meaning plus semantic noise is equal to the desired total message meaning
at the destination."
Prashant Parikh [28] distinguishes between speaker meaning and addressee interpretation
in a game{theoretic model of communication. An utterance may remain ambiguous until it
is placed in context. Sometimes this gives the speaker a choice between making an utterance
that can be understood without contextual information and an utterance that requires that
information. Vagueness may intervene in either case because speaker meaning and addressee
meaning may only overlap rather than being identical. One could add that in an incomplete
information setting context need not be common knowledge, which would be a source of
noise.
De Jaegher [9] makes the point that vagueness in language can be eciency enhancing. He
argues that to account for vagueness in language it is not enough to look at Nash equilibria of
a game with error{free communication. After all, the denition of Nash equilibrium requires
that players know each others' strategies and therefore which messages communicate which
concepts. His answer is to look for correlated equilibria, or equivalently Nash equilibria of an
extended game with a correlation device. This technique plays a similar role to subjecting
communication to noise in our model. In both cases language is conceived as a mechanism
that takes messages as inputs and generates random outputs.
Lipman [26] asks \Why is language vague?" and rejects a number of explanations sug-
32gested by rst-order intuition. As part of his argument he points out that there cannot be an
advantage to mixing in a common-interest sender-receiver game. In our model, in contrast,
agents do not have to resort to mixing to create noise, and conict of interest is an important
motivator. The exogenous component of vagueness in our setting is given by a language that
acts as a noisy channel. We do show that vagueness in this sense can be compounded by
strategic concerns.
Pinker, Novak and Lee [31] stress that both conict and cooperation play a signicant
role in human communication. They draw on this interplay of objectives to explain why
Grice's [17] principles of ecient communication fail to explain indirect speech. Part of the
theory they advance relies on the logic of plausible deniability, which in turn depends on
the interpretability of messages. They sketch a game-theoretic model in which the speaker
chooses the degree of directness of his message and conclude that greater conict results in
less direct speech.
In a recent paper on leadership and obfuscation, Dewan and Myatt [10] model \clarity
of communication" by essentially the same means as we model the exogenous component of
vagueness in the present paper. A leader's message can induce dierent interpretations by
party activists. Interpretations are draws from a normal distribution that is centered on the
leader's message, with clarity of communication measured by the distribution's precision. In
Dewan and Myatt's baseline model information transmission is not strategic and therefore
there is no incentive for the leader to manipulate vagueness. In an extension of their model,
listeners' attention may be limited, giving leaders an incentive to obfuscate in order to avoid
attention drifting to others leaders. Obfuscation is modeled by allowing choice of variance.
In an earlier paper, Blume, Board and Kawamura [4] (henceforth BBK), we studied
noisy communication with a dierent noise technology. In BBK messages either go through
as sent or are drawn from an error distribution independent of the sent message. As in
the present paper, there is exogenous vagueness expressed through the noise mechanism.
Furthermore, noise can be benecial. An attractive feature of the model in the present
paper that is absent in both CS and BBK is that here the sender chooses distributions of
interpretations and thereby exercises control over the probability that the receiver will end
up with a concentrated posterior belief. In a communicative equilibrium, a receiver with an
33interpretation that induces close to a uniform posterior belief faces a situation not unlike
someone who must base a decision on a judgement in a borderline case.
Finally, there has been some recent experimental work examining communication in the
presence of vagueness. Agranov and Schotter [1] compare natural language communication
(using words) with the use of a precise mathematical language. Arguing that words may
be seen as vaguer than mathematical statements, they nd no evidence that this vagueness
reduces the eciency of communication as long as the number of available words is small.
Serra-Garcia, van Damme & Potters [38] compare communication with precise messages,
where the set of available messages is equal to the type space, to communication with vague
messages, where the set of available messages is the set of all subsets of the type space. They
nd that vague messages will be used when available while their availability has no eect
on eciency. Note that the notion of vagueness employed in the current paper diers from
the ones used in these experimental studies, where in both cases the sets of messages used
would have no eect the set of equilibrium outcomes.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that strategic agents are likely to add intentional vagueness to an exogenously
vague language. In the two-type case the degree of intentional vagueness in equilibrium
increases with the level of conict between agents. In addition we conrm results from
earlier work that exogenous vagueness can enhance eciency by mitigating conict. With
an arbitrary nite number of types, interior types will be intentionally vague by distorting
their messages upward in equilibrium relative to the messages the receiver would prefer them
to send, given the receiver's equilibrium strategy. Also, as the level of conict increases, so
does the excess demand for vagueness of all sender types.
34A Proofs
We start with some preliminaries. As in section 2.3, we dene an expectation function ,
which gives the expected value of the sender's type if she sends message m0 when t = 0 and
message m1 when t = 1:
(q;m0;m1;;) 
  m1;2 (q)
(1   )  m0;2 (q) +   m1;2 (q)
.
This function has 180 rotational symmetry; the following lemma describes this symmetry
in the special case where m1 = 1.
Lemma 1 Suppose m0 6= 1. Then the action function  satises the following symmetry
property:
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Proof. Notice that the condition
(q







   x;m0;;) 8x 2 R
is equivalent to
  1;2 (q)(q + x)
  1;2 (q + x) + (1   )  m0;2 (q + x)
= 1  
  1;2 (q   x)
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We now present some results that describe several properties of communicative equilibria.
Recall that we assume without loss of generality that m0  m1; further, in a communicative
equilibrium, m0 6= m1, so m0 < m1. Lemma 2 states that, in any such equilibrium, the
receiver's chosen action is a strictly monotone function of q.
Lemma 2 In a communicative equilibrium, the receiver's action a is a strictly increasing
function of the interpretation q.
Proof. In any equilibrium, the receiver's action function satises






For the normal distribution, the likelihood ratio
m0;2(q)
m1;2(q) is strictly decreasing in q for m0 <
m1.
Since the sender, for given t, wants a higher action than the receiver, it follows that the
type-1 will always choose an extremal message. Formally,
Lemma 3 In a communicative equilibrium m1 = 1.
Proof. By Lemma 2 the receiver's action function a(q) is a strictly increasing function of q.
Furthermore, a(q) < 1 for all q 2 R. Therefore  (1 + b   a(q))
2, the type-1 sender's payo
from the interpretation q, is also a strictly increasing function of q. This and the fact that
361;2 strictly rst-order stochastically dominates m0;2 for any m0 < 1 implies that
Z 1
 1
 (1 + b   a(q))
2 1;2 (q)dq >
Z 1
 1
 (1 + b   a(q))
2 m0;2 (q)dq, for all m0 < 1.
Henceforth, then, we assume that m1 = 1. The optimization problem for the type-0
sender is much trickier to solve, since in a candidate equilibrium with m0 < m1, dierent
messages not only shift, but also change the shape of the induced distribution of actions.
Some care is required to ensure that sending the specied m0 is globally optimal. To this
end we repeatedly make use of an important technical observation. As long as the action
function of the receiver satises equation (2) (see the denition of equilibrium in section
2.1), the expected payo of a type-t sender is a convolution of two quasi-concave functions.
Furthermore, the density of the normal distribution is log-concave. Ibragimov [19] shows
that under these conditions the convolution itself will be quasi-concave. The following lemma
adapts his result to the present environment.
Lemma 4 If the receiver's action function a is strictly increasing in the interpretation q,







is a strictly quasi-concave function of m, and any m with dV S
dm (m;t) = 0 is the unique
global maximizer for type t.














Note that given our monotonicity assumption on a and by virtue of the fact that for any t
there is a unique at that solves maxa US (a;t;b), U is either (i) strictly increasing, (ii) strictly
decreasing, or (iii) there exists a value q0 such that U is strictly increasing for q < q0 and
strictly decreasing for q > q0: In cases (i) and (ii), the result follows because the normal
37distribution satises the strict-monotone-liklihood-ratio property and therefore strict rst-







































































using the fact jUj is bounded. Dene   q   q0. Note that we have dU
dq (q0 + ) < 0 and
dU
dq (q0   ) > 0 for all  > 0. Now suppose that dV S



























































Note that for  > 0 ( < 0) we are inating (deating) the negative terms and deating
(inating) the positive terms in the integrand. Therefore dV S
dm (m + ) < 0 for  > 0 and
dV S
dm (m + ) > 0 for  < 0; i.e. V S is strictly quasi-concave and m is a global maximum.
We can now start to prove our main results. The proofs make use of the function V
dened in section 2.3; V gives the expected utility of the type-0 sender with bias b if she
sends message m when the reveiver expects her to send message m0 and the type-1 sender






2  m0; (q)dq.
38Proof of Proposition 1. Let b = 1
2 and suppose we have a communicative equilib-
rium where the sender chooses m = (m0;1) with m0 < 1. From Lemma 1, we know





















. Given Lemma 4, q





. If   1
2, q > m0, so the type-0 sender will deviate
and send m = minfq;1g instead of m0; in this case, then, a communicative equilibrium
does not exist. Suppose instead that  > 1
2, Solving m0 = q, we obtain
m









Notice that this expression must be less than 1. If m
0 lies between 0 and 1, we have a unique
communicative equilibrium with the sender choosing m = (m
0;1); if m
0  0, we have a
unique communicative equilibrium with the sender choosing m = (0;1).
Proof of Proposition 2. In a communicative equilibrium, the sender chooses m = (m0;1)
for some m0 2 [0;1), and the receiver's action function is given by a(q) = (q;m0;1;;).
Since (q;m0;1;;) is strictly increasing in q and bounded below by 0, for b = 0,
 (b   (q;m0;1;;))
2 is a strictly decreasing function of q. This, and the fact that m0;2
rst-order stochastically dominates m;2 for any m0 > m implies that V3 (0;m;m) < 0 for
all m 2 [0;1). This means that whatever message the receiver expects the type-0 sender to
send, she wants to send a lower message, and hence the unique communicative equilibrium
(with b = 0) is with m = (0;1). Given continuity of V3 (b;m;m) in b, then, there is a non-
empty interval [0;b] for which there is a unique communicative equilibrium which exhibits
maximum dierentiation.
Proof of Proposition 3. Fix some m 2 [0;1). From the proof of Proposition 2 we know
that V3 (0;m;m) < 0. By similar reasoning and the fact that (q;m;1;;) is bounded
above by 1, we have V3 (1;m;m) > 0. Continuity and the intermediate value theorem then
imply that there exists a b(m) 2 (0;1) such that
V3 (b(m);m;m) = 0:
39From Lemma 4, then, it follows that m = (m;1) is an equilibrium stratgey for the sender
when b = b(m).
Proof of Proposition 4. Dierentiating V (the expected utility of the type-0 sender)
with respect to the message she actually sends, and evaluating at the message m0 that the




(2b   )m0;2 (q)
q   m0
2 dq.
The derivative of this expression with respect to m0 evaluated at m0 = 1 is equal to
dV3 (b;m0;m0)
dm0
   
m0=1
=




This derivative is positive exactly when b < . Using the fact that V3 (b;1;1) = 0, this implies
that when b < , there exists m0 < 1 for which V3 (b;m0;m0) < 0. Since V3 (b;m0;m0) is
continuous in m0, there are two possibilities. Either V3 (b;m0;m0) < 0 8m0 2 (0;1), in which
case there is a communicative equilibrium with maximal dierentiation, where the sender's
strategy is m = (0;1). Or there exists an m0 2 (0;1) for which V3 (b;m0;m0) = 0, in which
case Lemma 4 implies that we have a communicative equilibrium with intentional vagueness,
where the sender's strategy is m = (m0;1).
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that   1
2 and b =  (we extend the result to the case
where b >  later), and the type-0 sender sends message m0 < 1. We claim that she obtains at
least as high an expected utility from sending message 1; combining this result with Lemma 4,
we derive a contradiction. To compare V (;m0;m0) with V (;m0;1), we show that the type-
0 sender (weakly) prefers a 1
2 1
2 gamble between (1   k;m0;1;;) and (1 + k;m0;1;;)
to a 1
2   1
2 gamble between (m0   k;m0;1;;) and (m0 + k;m0;1;;) (property *), for
all k  0. It follows that V (;m0;m0)  V (;m0;1).






. For these values, m0 + k 
1+m0
2  1   k.







402. (q;m0;1;;) is strictly increasing in q;















and is bounded above and below; therefore,  is strictly convex in q for q < q and
strictly concave in q for q > q; and
4. (q;m0;1;;) = 1
2.
It follows that
   (m0 + k;m0;1;;)  (1   k;m0;1;;)     0 and
   (m0   k;m0;1;;)  (1 + k;m0;1;;)     0;






, and thus property * is satised.
Now consider any k with k >
1 m0
2 . As before, we compare a 1
2   1
2 gamble between
interpretations q = m0 + k and q = m0   k with a 1
2   1
2 gamble between interpretations
q = 1+k and q = 1 k. The rst pair of gambles induces actions (m0 +k;m0;1;;) and
(m0   k;m0;1;;); let:
a = (m0 + k;m0;1;;)   
b =    (m0   k;m0;1;;):
Similarly, the second pair of gambles induces actions (1+k;m0;1;;) and (1 k;m0;1;;);
let:
c = (1 + k;m0;1;;)   
d =    (1   k;m0;1;;):
41For values of k >
1 m0
2 in this range, we have c  a  0 and d  a  0. We now show that
a+b  c+d; substituting in the expressions for a;b;c; and d above, this inequality becomes:
(m0 + k;m0;1;;)   (m0   k;m0;1;;)
 (1 + k;m0;1;;)   (1   k;m0;1;;):















































































22 + (1   )
 (3)
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22 + (1   )
 (4)
Notice that numerators of (3) and (4) are the same, and positive; it follows that
(m0 + k;m0;1;;)   (m0   k;m0;1;;)  (1 + k;m0;1;;)   (1   k;m0;1;;)








































22 )(1   2)  0
















2 + 2(d   a)(c   a):






It follows immediately that the 1
2   1
2 gamble between (m0 + k;m0;1;;) and (m0  
k;m0;1;;) is preferred to the 1
2   1
2 gamble between (1 + k;m0;1;;) and (1  
k;m0;1;;). Thus, when b = , the type-0 sender obtains at least as high expected utility
from message 1 as from message m0.
To complete the proof, consider the case where b > . Here, the Proposition follows from




and the fact that the normal distribution satises the strict monotone likelihood ratio prop-
erty (see the proof of Proposition 9 for details).
Lemma 5 z1(b;m) = V31(b;m;m) > 0 8m 2 [0;1):
Proof. Notice that m;2 (m + x) x
2 =  m;2 (m   x)
( x)
2 . Furthermore, for all m 2 [0;1),
1;2(q)
1;2(q)+(1 )m;2(q) is a strictly increasing function of q and therefore gives greater weight
to m0;2 (m + x) x
2 than to m;2 (m   x)
( x)










44Proof of Proposition 6. For m0 < 1, dene
q















is the point of symmetry of the expectation function (q;m0;1;;) | see
Lemma 1 above). If  < 1
2, then q(m) > m, in which case we claim that the existence of a
communicative equilibrium requires that b < 1
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1;2 (q) + (1   )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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1;2(q)+(1 )m0;2(q) is a function of q that is sym-
metric about q (m0), strictly increasing to the left of q (m0) and strictly decreasing to the
right of q (m). So as long as q (m0) > m; it assigns greater weight to m0;2 (m + x) x
2
than to m0;2 (m   x)
( x)






Now consider raising b above 1
2: From Lemma 5, V31(b;m;m) > 0 8m 2 [0;1) and in
particular for m = m0. Hence V3 (b;m0;m0) > 0 for all b > 1
2, which is not consistent with
equilibrium.









Therefore, if b > ; by continuity of z there exists an m 2 (0;1) such that for all m0 2 (m;1]
we have z (b;m0) > 0. Hence, for b >  pooling at at message m = 1 is asymptotically
stable. If b < ; then
dz(b;1)
dm > 0, i.e. m = 1 is a hyperbolic source rather than a sink of the
vagueness dynamic, and therefore unstable.
It remains to show that there is a (Lyapunov) stable equilibrium when b  .
Consider the case b <  rst. Then there are two subcases: If z (b;m)  0 for all
m 2 [0;1), then m = 0 is stable. Otherwise, there exists exists m0 2 [0;1) with z (b;m0) > 0.
At the same time, given the case we are considering, there is m00 2 (m0;1) with z (b;m00) < 0.
Dene m  inf fm j z (m;b) < 0, m > m0g and m  supfm j z (m;b) > 0, m < mg: Note
that m  m. If m < m, then z (b;m) = 0 for all m0 in the open set (m;m), and therefore
any such m0 is stable. If m = m, then any open set (m;m + ) contains a subinterval on
which z (b;m) < 0 and any open set (m   ;m) contains a subinterval on which z (b;m) > 0;
and therefore m is stable.
Finally, consider b = : If z (b;m))  0 for all m 2 [0;1], then m = 1 is stable. If
z (b;m00) < 0 for some m00 2 [0;1), then either, then either z (b;m)  0 for all m 2 [0;m00) or
there exists m0 < m00 with z (b;m00) > 0. In that case, the argument given for the case b < 
applies.
Lemma 6 In any pure-strategy equilibrium the receiver's action rule is continuously dif-
ferentiable. If in addition the sender's strategy is monotone and communicative, then the
receiver's action rule is strictly increasing.
Proof. If the sender uses a pure strategy, then with any equilibrium message m we can
associate the set of types (m) who use that message. Let M denote the set of equilibrium
messages. Then the receiver's posterior belief about the sender's type given interpretation q
is
(t j q) =
mt;2 (q)) (t)
P
m2M m;2 (q) ((m))
.






2 (t j q)
=
P
m2M m;2 (q) ((m))E [t j t 2 (m)]
P
m2M m;2 (q) ((m))
.
(Note that, as in the two-type case, the receiver's best response is to choose an action equal
to the expectation of t.) Continuous dierentiability of the receiver's action rule follows from
continuous dierentiability of m;2 for any m and the fact that m;2 is everywhere positive.
If the sender's strategy is monotone and communicative, more than one message is sent.
Let there be k > 1 such messages. It will be convenient to reindex messages and to use
mi to denote the ith equilibrium message and i to denote the set of types who send that
message. Then we can rewrite the receiver's action rule as
a(q) =
Pk
i=1 mi;2 (q) (i)E [t j t 2 i]
Pk
i=1 mi;2 (q) (i)
,
where E [t j t 2 i+1] > E [t j t 2 i] for all i = 1;:::;k   1 (which can be satised because
of monotonicity) and  (i) > 0 for all i = 1;:::;k. To prove that a is a strictly increasing
function of q, we proceed by induction. Dene  (q j mi) 
mi;2(q)(i)
Pk









(qjmk) + 1 = 1
(qjmk). SMLRP implies that each of the fractions on the
left{hand side decrease as q increases. Hence  (q j mk) is (strictly) increasing in q. This
establishes the claim for k = 2. We will now show that if it holds for k, then it holds for






 (q j mi)E [t j t 2 i]




~  (q j mi)E [t j t 2 i]
)
+  (q j mk+1)E [t j t 2 k+1].
47The result follows because the expression in curly brackets, which is is strictly smaller
than E [t j t 2 k+1], by the induction hypothesis is strictly increasing in q and because
 (q j mk+1) is strictly increasing in q.
Proof of Proposition 9. Given the receiver's equilibrium action rule a; dene type t's




















This and the fact that a is a strictly increasing function of q from Lemma 6 implies that
@Us(a(q);t;b)
@t is strictly increasing in q: Since m;2 satises the strict monotone likelihood ratio





@ ~ V (a;s;ms)
@m
 0
for a type s < 1: Then
@ ~ V (a;;ms)
@m
> 0
for any type  > s: Using Lemma 4, this implies that either m > ms or m0
 = 1 for all
0  s: Similarly, when
@ ~ V (a;t;mt)
@m
 0
for a type t > 0; we get that for any type  < t either m < mt or m0
 = 0 for all 0  t:
48Proof of Proposition 10. The receiver's utility coincides with the utility of a sender
whose type is less than t: Given the strict monotonicity of the receiver's action rule from
Lemma 6, single crossing and SMLRP, this type would want to send a message less than mt.
Proof of Proposition 12. With b > 1
2 beliefs that are concentrated on the lowest type
are the least favorable ones for every type. Therefore, if there is a monotone communicative
equilibrium in the noisy-channel game with sender strategy m; receiver strategy a and belief
system , there is an equilibrium in the channel-choice game in which the sender uses strategy
m; the receiver responds with a(q) to any interpretation q that is received through the noisy
channel, responds with action 0 to any interpretation that is received through the clear
channel, has belief (q) after any interpretation that is received through the noisy channel
and believes that the sender is the lowest type after every interpretation that is received
through the clear channel.
Proof of Proposition 13. Recall that the receiver uses a pure strategy in any Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. Therefore in any PBE each clear message m induces exactly one
action am 2 [0;1]: In the common interest game there is a type t for whom am is the ideal
action. This type strictly prefers sending message m to any noisy equilibrium message ~ m:
By continuity, there is an open neighborhood O of t such that all types in O strictly prefer
sending the clear message m to sending any noisy equilibrium message.
B Utility loss from intentional vagueness in the CS
model.
We observed in the introduction that there is intentional vagueness even in the CS model:
Given the receiver's interpretation of messages in a communicative equilibrium, he would
prefer that some subset of sender types deviate from their equilibrium strategy and send mes-
sages that are associated with lower types. For example, consider the two-step equilibrium
of the uniform-quadratic version of the CS model when the sender's bias b = 1
8: sender types
t 2 [0; 1
4) send one message, say m1, while sender types t 2 [1
4;1] send a dierent message,
49say m2; the receiver chooses action a = 1
8 if he observes m1, and action a = 5
8 if he observes
m2. Given this equilibrium response, however, note that the receiver would be better o if
types between 1
4 and 3
8 deviated from their equilibrium strategy and sent message m1 instead




Consider and n-step equilibrium of the uniform-quadratic version of the CS model, with




+ 2i(i   n)b; i = 0;:::;n:
Following the reasoning above, it is easy to see that the receiver (assuming his equilibrium
interpretation of messages remains unchanged) would prefer all and only sender types be-
tween ti and ti + b (i = 1;:::;n   1) to send the message corresponding to the preceding




































(where dxe is the smallest integer greater than x). Figure 8 plots the receiver's utility loss
in this equilibrium.









Figure 8: Receiver's ex ante utility loss from intentional vagueness in the CS model
51References
[1] Agranov, Marina and Andrew Schotter (2008): \Ambiguity and Vagueness in
the Announcement (Bernanke) Game: and Experimental Study of Natural Language,"
working paper, Department of Economics, New York University.
[2] Basu, Kaushik and J orgen W. Weibull (1991): \Strategy Subsets Closed Under
Rational Behavior," Economics Letters 36, 141{146.
[3] Blinder, Allen, M. Ehrmann, M. Fratzcher, J. de Haan, and D. Jansen
(2008): \Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and
Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature XLVI, 910{945.
[4] Blume, Andreas, Oliver J. Board and Kohei Kawamura (2007): \Noisy Talk,"
Theoretical Economics 2, 395{440.
[5] Boudreau, Cheryl, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, Daniel B. Ro-
driguez (2005): \The Judge as a Fly on the Wall: Interpretive Lessons from the
Positive Political Theory of Legislation," UCSD Working Paper.
[6] Crawford, Vincent P. and Joel Sobel (1982): \Strategic Information Transmis-
sion," Econometrica 50, 1431{1451.
[7] Crawford, Vincent P. (1998): \A Survey of Experiments on Communication via
Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory 78, 286{298.
[8] Crawford, Vincent P. (2003): \Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and
Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," The American Economic Review
93, 133{149.
[9] De Jaegher, K. (2003): \A Game-Theoretic Rationale for Vagueness," Linguistics
and Philosophy 26, 637{659.
[10] Dewan, Torun and David P. Myatt (2007): \The Qualities of Leadership: Di-
rection, Communication, and Obfuscation," forthcoming in American Political Science
Review.
52[11] Echenique, Federico (2008): \The Correspondence Principle," The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Editors: Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E.
Blume. Palgrave MacMillan.
[12] Ettinger, David and Philippe Jehiel (2009): \A Theory of Deception," American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming.
[13] Farber, Daniel A. and Philip P. Frickey (1988): \Legislative Intent and Public
Choice," Virginia Law Review 74, 423{469.
[14] Fine, Kit (1975): \Vagueness, Truth and Logic," Synthese 30, 265{300.
[15] Geraats, P. (2007): \The Mystique of Central Bank Speak," International Journal
of Central Banking 3, 37{80.
[16] Greenhouse, Linda (1991): \Morality Play's Twist," New York Times, November 3,
1991.
[17] Grice, H. Paul (1975): \Logic and Conversation," Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3,
Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan, eds. Academic Press, New York.
[18] Hirsch, Morris W. and Stephen Smale (1974): Dierential Equations, Dynamical
Systems and Linear Algebra, New York: Academic Press.
[19] Ibragimov, Il'dar Abdullovich (1956): \On the Composition of Unimodal Distri-
butions," Theory of Probability and its Applications 1, 255{260.
[20] Ivanov, M. (2008): \Information Revelation in Competitive Markets," working paper,
McMaster University.
[21] J ager, Gerhard (2008): \Applications of Game Theory in Linguistics," Language
and Linguistics Compass 2, 1{16.
[22] Johnson, Justin P. and David P. Myatt (2006): \On the Simple Economics of
Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," American Economic Review 96, 756{
784.
53[23] Kartik, Navin, Marco Ottaviani and Francesco Squintani (2007):
\Credulity, Lies, and Costly Talk," Journal of Economic Theory 134, 93{116.
[24] Lewis, Tracy R. and David R.M. Sappington (1994): \Supplying Information
to Facilitate Price Discrimination," International Economic Review 35, 309{327.
[25] Li, Wei (2007): \Peddling Inuence through Intermediaries: Propaganda," working
paper, University of California, Riverside.
[26] Lipman, Barton L. (2006): \Why is Language Vague?" manuscript, Boston Univer-
sity.
[27] Nowak, Martin A., David C. Krakauer and Andreas Dress (1999): \An Error
Limit for the Evolution of Language," Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences 266, 2131{2136.
[28] Parikh, Prashant (2000): \Communication, Meaning, and Interpretation," Linguis-
tics and Philosophy 23, 185{212.
[29] Parikh, Rohit (1994): \Vagueness and Utility: The Semantics of Common Nouns,"
Linguistics and Philosophy 17, 521{535.
[30] Pinker, Steven (2007): The Stu of Thought: Language as a Window into Human
Nature, Viking, New York.
[31] Pinker, Steven, Martin A. Nowak and James J. Lee (2008): \The Logic of
Indirect Speech," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105, 833{838.
[32] Posner, Richard A. (1987): \Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation
of Statutes and the Constitution," Case Western Reserve Law Review 37, 179{217.
[33] Reiter, Ehud and Somayajulu Sripada (2002): \Human Variation in Lexical
Choice," Association for Computational Linguistics 28, 545{553.
[34] Rizzo, Mario J. and Frank S. Arnold (1987): \An Economic Framework for
Statutory Interpretation," Law and Contemporary Problems 50, 165{180.
54[35] Samuelson, Paul A. (1941): \The Stability of Equilibrium: Comparative Statics and
Dynamics," Econometrica 9, 97{120.
[36] Samuelson, Paul A. (1947): Foundations of Economic Analysis, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
[37] Schwartz, Jean-Luc, Louis-Jean Boe, Nathalie Vall e, and Christian Abry
(1997): \The Dispersion{Focalization Theory of Vowel Systems," Journal of Phonetics
25, 255{286.
[38] Serra-Garcia, Marta, Eric van Damme, and Jan Potters (2008): \Truth or
Eency? Communication in a Sequential Public Good Game," working paper, Tilburg
University.
[39] Shannon, Claude E. and Warren Weaver (1949): The Mathematical Theory of
Communication, University of Illinois Press: Urbana, Illinois.
[40] Sobel, Joel (1985): \A Theory of Credibility," The Review of Economic Studies 4,
557{573.
[41] Stein, Jeremy C. (1989): \Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy
Announcements," American Economic Review 97, 42{42.
[42] Weaver, Warren (1949): \Some Recent Contributions to the Mathematical Theory
of Communication," in Shannon, Claude E. and Warren Weaver (1949): The
Mathematical Theory of Communication, University of Illinois Press: Urbana, Illinois.
[43] Williamson, Timothy (1994): Vagueness, Routledge: London and New York.
[44] Zadeh, Lotfi (1975), \Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning," Synthese 30, 407{
428.
55